On the twenty third of April 2024, a Piper Archer II crashed in South Ayrshire, Scotland, after shedding energy. There have been two on board. Each suffered critical accidents and the sunshine plane, a 48-year previous PA-28 registered within the UK as G-BVNS, won’t ever fly once more. The AAIB report makes a transparent case for carburettor icing as the reason for the engine failure, however truthfully, that’s the least fascinating a part of this incident.
The crash occurred on strategy to Glasgow Prestwick Airport, which serves the west of Scotland with two lengthy asphalt runways. The first runway is 12/30 with 2,986 metres, the longest industrial runway in Scotland. Interested by using “industrial” as a qualifier, I searched to find that there’s a longer army runway at Campbeltown (Machrihanish), 3,049 metres, constructed to deal with massive army plane in addition to act as an emergency touchdown website for the NASA House Shuttle. Though Campbeltown Airport is now industrial, the present operational size is 1,750 metres making Prestwick the longest runway in Scotland, no qualifier wanted. There’s a second perpendicular runway, cited within the report and on the chart as 03/21 with 1,905 metres . A month after the accident the runway was up to date to 02/20.
The Piper Archer II was owned by a neighborhood flying membership and had a full engine overhaul simply over a yr in the past, in January 2023, accumulating about 150 working hours on the brand new engine.
Right here’s a video of the plane in higher days:
The pilot had a complete of 307 hours, of which 101 had been on kind. His most up-to-date flight had been in November 2023. The flying membership at Prestwick requires pilots have a minimum of one flight each 62 days, so the pilot scheduled a flight with the membership’s Chief Flying Teacher. That is customary apply: the trainer is there as a security pilot and, presuming all goes nicely, indicators off the pilot as protected to fly.
The pilot’s PPL score for single engine planes had lapsed in July 2023. Nevertheless, he additionally held a Mild Plane Pilot’s Licence (LAPL) which has barely totally different recency necessities: 12 hours within the final two years together with an hour with an teacher. The pilot believed that he may proceed flying on the LAPL even with no kind score so long as he did an hour with an teacher.
The AAIB makes an enormous fuss about how complicated the principles are in the event you maintain each a PPL and an LAPL, saying that “the existence of an LAPL and a PPL confused the scenario as regards to the validity of rankings.” Nevertheless, I disagree: the pilot understood the 2 licences and so far as I can see, was right in {that a} flight with an teacher may meet the necessities of the LAPL, which might enable him to proceed flying small planes within the UK.
The Chief Flying Teacher (CFI) on the flying membership, who was additionally the Head of Coaching, didn’t have a present CAA medical certificates. The CFI claimed later that he had defined this to the pilot. The impact of this was that the CFI couldn’t fly as an teacher: for the needs of this flight, he was merely a passenger.
He’d observed some worrying signs in September 2022, 18 months earlier than the accident, and noticed his physician, who was advised that his signs may have been brought on by sunstroke. He didn’t communicate to an Aeromedical Examiner. In December 2022, he had one other episode. Involved, he stopped flying solo and solely flew with licensed pilots and college students who had already flown solo. He noticed one other physician in 2023 however didn’t get a analysis. When his Class 1 medical certificates expired, he determined to not renew it, considering he may nonetheless fly one other yr on his Class 2 medical certificates. In October 2023, the CAA contacted him to say that his medical certificates was suspended.
Within the meantime, his situation was lastly accurately recognized and he began remedy. He had no additional episodes within the time main as much as the accident flight.
Right here’s the place it will get legally murky.
The CAA (the Civil Aviation Authority within the UK) requires a pilot to have accomplished a minimum of 3 take-offs, approaches and landings within the previous 90 days with the intention to carry passengers. That is no matter which licence you maintain.
It is not uncommon for pilots with a PPL to fly three take-offs and landings with an teacher with the intention to get again up to the mark. Nevertheless, on this case, the trainer didn’t have a sound medical and was not in a position to act as the trainer for the flight. Professionally, he was the Chief Flying Teacher (CFI) and Head of Coaching for the membership. Legally, on this flight, he was a passenger.
In some way neither of them registered this. The sequence of unsuitable assumptions units the tone for the flight: each pilots believed they had been doing the fitting factor.

They deliberate to fly for an hour to do some common workout routines after which return to the airfield for 3 circuits. The flying membership anticipated pilots to refuel the plane on the finish of the day’s flying. The night time earlier than, the gas had been topped up with about 50 litres (about 13.2 US gallons) after the final flight. The 2 males confirmed the gas ranges and noticed that there was no want for extra gas.
They departed on runway 30 and flew within the native space, together with training compelled landings.
The climate was nice: gentle wind and good visibility with the cloud base at 3,000 toes. The temperature that day was 11°C (52°F) with a dewpoint of 5°C (41°F). Their solely challenge that day was that the temperature and the dewpoint had been very shut, which suggests larger humidity. This issues as a result of the temperature within the carburettor is far colder, brought on by the Venturi impact (when air accelerates by means of a slender passage) and the gas vaporisation. The mixed impact can drop the temperature contained in the carburettor by as a lot as 30°C. If the air is humid, the moisture within the air freezes, creating ice which blocks the engine’s air provide.
The vital level is that it doesn’t must be freezing temperatures for there to be a threat of icing within the carburettor. To counter this, scorching air from across the exhaust is redirected into the carburettor to maintain the temperature up. The draw back is that the warmer, much less dense air means a discount of engine energy. Additionally, the air coming from the exhaust is unfiltered, which might introduce grime and particles into the engine. In humid circumstances just like the day of the accident, the CAA advises pilots to make use of carb warmth at any energy setting the place there’s a threat of icing. For instance, at cruise energy, the throttle is extra open and the discount of engine energy is extra of a problem. At descent energy, the throttle valve is extra closed, narrowing the passage additional and intensifying the Venturi impact. Consequently, it is not uncommon to at all times apply carb warmth whereas descending to land.

After all, the pilot and the CFI would have recognized this. Each stated that they recalled utilizing carb warmth throughout the apply compelled landings.
About 40 minutes later, they referred to as Prestwick ATC to say they had been able to rejoin the circuit.
British Airways does A320 base coaching at Prestwick (FlyerTalk), particularly for brand spanking new cadet pilots doing their first kind score. It’s solely a requirement for model new pilots; pilots transferring from one other fleet are rated within the sim.

When the Piper referred to as to rejoin, a British Airways A320 was within the left-hand circuit. The controller cleared the Piper to affix left base for Runway 30.
The Piper approached and landed on the runway, stopping for about 90 seconds with the intention to enhance the spacing between it and the Airbus A320 within the circuit. Then it took off once more and joined the fitting hand circuit on the north aspect of the airport.
Sadly the 2 plane nonetheless didn’t have sufficient separation. The controller requested the Piper to “enter an orbit”, that’s, to fly a holding sample, staying out of the way in which of the Airbus 320 making an strategy to runway 30. They flew three circles over the course of three.5 minutes.
The controller then cleared them to affix proper base and report again when on closing strategy. The pilot acknowledged the decision.
Throughout that third orbit, figuring out they had been cleared to return to the runway, the pilot had descended to 800 toes above imply sea degree. He turned out of the circle onto the bottom leg.
Nevertheless, the engine was shedding energy, quick.
The CFI didn’t see the pilot react to the truth that their engine energy was very low. They had been at 800 toes; too near the bottom to begin explaining. The CFI referred to as “I’ve management” and took over flying, beginning by pitching the plane for finest gliding efficiency. They didn’t have flaps prolonged. In line with the PA-28 Pilot’s Working Handbook (POH) the most effective glide pace is 76 knots, permitting them to glide about 1.6 nautical miles for each thousand toes of altitude (descending at 800 toes per minute).
They had been travelling 85 knots and fewer than two nautical miles from the runway. He thought they could simply make it.
The controller watched the Piper roll out of the orbit in the direction of proper base, as anticipated. He then turned to take a look at the Airbus A320 within the left-hand circuit whereas he spoke to that crew. Then he turned again.
The Piper was gone.
The CFI remained targeted on the airfield. He didn’t discover or didn’t take into account the fields to his proper, which had been simply in vary. He may see runway 21 and the Search and Rescue hangar forward. They descended at round 460 toes per minute, a managed glide.
As they continued to descend within the glide, he realised that the airfield was “transferring up the windscreen”. They weren’t going to make it.
The CFI shortly advised the pilot to vary the gas tank choice whereas he looked for some place else to land. To the fitting, his aspect, all he may see was timber; they had been too low to make it to the protected touchdown space.
There was a patch of open floor to the left. It must do.
He thought of a Mayday name however the floor was arising quick. It was higher to give attention to the tough touchdown. He turned left and aligned himself with the patch of land.
The Piper’s airspeed had dropped over the previous sixty seconds from 85 knots to under 60.
He noticed timber on his strategy path, transferring up in his sightline. He wasn’t certain they had been going to clear them. He raised the nostril, hoping for a tiny bit extra carry. For a second, it appeared like they could clear the timber.
The Piper’s airspeed was already under 60. Because the CFI raised the nostril, the plane started to buffet, a bodily vibration. That is the plane’s last-minute warning that it’s about to cease flying.
The left wing dipped. It struck the highest of a 15-metre/50-foot tree. This threw the plane right into a roll and leftward yaw. The Piper’s descent fee spiked to 4,250 toes per minute. That’s 48 mph/77km/h straight down.
In the meantime, the pilot’s recollection of what occurred is… not fairly the identical. He remembers that closing orbit and finishing the downwind checks. One among these things is the carb warmth, which he believed was already on. He exited the orbit when he felt the engine rpm drop. The instrument confirmed round 500 rpm. He remembered that the CFI stated one thing however he didn’t know what. He noticed timber forward, with an space of inexperienced past. The CFI pumped the throttle however the engine didn’t recuperate. Then he remembered the nostril elevating, and (incorrectly) that the plane was banked proper. The following factor he knew, they had been on the bottom.
All through, he believed that he was the one flying the plane.
The sequence from exiting the orbit to crashing into the bottom took simply over a minute.

Up within the tower, the controller was nonetheless in search of them, considering that perhaps the Piper was additional downwind, positioning for the strategy. He referred to as for them repeatedly, however bought no response. He appeared over in the direction of runway 21, that very same runway that the CFI initially hoped they’d make, however the runway was empty. He requested his colleagues within the tower to look at for the lacking Piper and referred to as the Airbus A320, asking the crew to vary to a right-hand circuit and see if they might see the Piper.
The Piper was about 1.5 miles away, crumpled on the bottom about 45 metres from the tree. After clipping the left wing and rolling right into a dive, they hit a fence put up laborious sufficient to tear the fitting wing off, earlier than bouncing and falling backwards right into a barbed-wire fence. Gas soaked into the bottom from each tanks. However the propeller was largely undamaged and there have been no slashmarks within the floor. The engine was useless or windmilling once they crashed.
Triggered by the influence, the pilot’s cell phone vibrated aggressively and sounded an alarm. When there was no response, the telephone made an automatic name to emergency providers (999). On reply, the telephone performs a looped recorded message that the proprietor of the telephone has been in a extreme crash, together with its latitude and longitude.
Emergency providers referred to as Prestwick ATC to inform them on the similar second because the A320 crew noticed the plane on the bottom in a subject. A coastguard helicopter primarily based at Prestwick flew to the scene, assembly emergency providers there. The 2 pilots had been recovered from the wreckage with critical accidents. They had been instantly transported to the trauma unit on the native hospital.
Each have since recovered.
The Piper Archer II was written off.

The AAIB took the wreckage to their hangar in Farnborough with the intention to verify it completely. They confirmed that the gas tank selector valve was set to LEFT and that there have been no obstructions. The gas pump swap was set to ON and the fuse was undamaged. The gas from each tanks had drained into the bottom on the crash website however the pump and gas pipes nonetheless held gas.
The pump nonetheless labored once they turned it on and the filter was away from particles and water. The air consumption filter was not blocked. The oil filter was freed from particles. The oil appeared regular.
The engine didn’t fail due to gas hunger or lack of oil. There have been no indicators of a pre-existing fault within the engine apart from the comparatively minor influence injury.
a damaged high-tension lead
a damaged oil filter casting
a dented pushrod tube and a bend within the pushrod
Once they changed these elements, the engine, magnetos and carburettor labored completely. They left the engine working for an hour with no points.
Whereas the crash destroyed the throttle, combination and carburettor warmth controls, the carburettor warmth valve was recovered. It was set to chilly.
The carburettor air inlet valve was discovered within the full chilly place, indicating that carburettor warmth was not chosen. The valve set up is such that the valve couldn’t have modified place when the plane struck the bottom.
However we already guessed that.
The pilot’s plan to get authorized to fly once more, benefiting from the two-year requirement of the LAPL as an alternative of the one-year necessities of the PPL, was convoluted however sound. The pilot appeared unclear concerning the 90-day rule however regardless, felt it didn’t matter as he was flying with an teacher, particularly the Head of Coaching on the flying college. Collectively, they might make sure that he glad the necessities of the LAPL and the flying membership rule.
The issue was the CFI with a suspended medical. The Head of Coaching who legally couldn’t act as an teacher. The person in the fitting seat, who was only a passenger, making the complete flight unlawful. The CFI insisted that he had warned the pilot. The pilot stated that he thought he was being instructed and that he was taking notes as they flew. His implication: passengers look out the window; instructors take notes.
If the CFI knew the plan, he knew the flight was unlawful the second they taxied out.
The CAA 90-day forex rule is specific.
A pilot shall not function an plane in industrial air transport or to carrypassengers:> (1) as PIC or co-pilot except he/she has carried out, within the previous 90 days,a minimum of 3 take-offs, approaches and landings…
The CFI, who was the Head of Coaching on the flying college, should have recognized the 90-day rule (to not point out the flying membership necessities) and that the pilot wanted to fly with an teacher.
What was he doing, sitting as a passenger with a pilot who hadn’t flown in over a yr?
From the AAIB report:
Conclusion
The engine probably stopped due to carburettor icing and a compelled touchdown ensued.The plane struck timber throughout the latter levels of the strategy to the compelled touchdown andcontrol was misplaced. Each occupants survived however sustained extreme accidents
The proof exhibits that neither pilot initiated the engine-out guidelines. The emergency process is to verify gas selector, gas pump, combination and carb warmth as quickly because the plane is pitched for finest glide. Each males believed that they had been the one in cost and assumed that the opposite would deal with the emergency checks.
All through, we see the identical points: each males assuming that issues are going to end up OK. The accident report goes on at size concerning the legality of the flight. However the actual challenge right here is the sequence of errors from the time of the orbit:
The pilot didn’t flip the carb warmth on throughout the orbits
The passenger took management of a flight with out being completely clear that the pilot was conscious
Apparently nobody had an correct image of what was occurring within the cockpit
Neither pilot shortly/accurately recognized a subject to land in
And eventually, neither pilot glanced at or turned on the carb warmth as soon as the engine failed
The reality is, each pilots may have been fully authorized and, primarily based on their actions that day, they’d nonetheless have crashed.


